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Kavolis: Nelson's Legacy of Comparative Studies

2. Nelson's Legacy of
Comparative Studies
Vytautas Kavolis

In the early seventies, Benjamin Nelson concluded a brief autobiographical statement by pointing in a new direction:
Recently ... I have become curious about several questions
related to my growing interest in the comparative study of
civilizations and of intercivilizational relations. Does the concept
"conscience" give us any clue as to some of the differences in the
distinctive patterns of development in various parts of the world?
What are the relations between the structures of conscience and the
tumultuous sociocultural processes of the 20th century across the
world? ... it is necessary to work one's way back through questions
of this sort if we hope to work toward a basic foundation for
sociology, history, and psychology and anthropology ... we are
now obliged to do a massive amount of work to get anywhere near
these questions. 1
The beginning of an autobiography reveals assumptions about what
must exist (or occur) when the life of an individual commences its
changes into a meaningful story. An autobiographical ending suggests
what an individual has been transformed into by his passage through the
machinery of his life, what his life signifies to him at the point when he is
ready to leave it, as a finished (but perhaps, in later autobiographies,
revisable) text, to others. Having begun with "a question for which I
haven't really ever found an answer" (how he became a medievalist),
Benjamin Nelson characteristically concluded with a reformulation of his
old European questions in new and expanded frameworks. The old
themes of conscience, work (both as necessity and as hope), and going
back in order to advance to more "basic foundations" are now restated in
a manner requiring a comparative study of civilizations.
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The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations,
originally founded under the leadership of Pitirim A. Sorokin and mainly
active in Europe, was revived at a meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science in Philadelphia, December 29, 1971.
Nelson served as its president until the spring of 1977, taking a particular
interest in involving comparative civilizational studies with all of the
most vital intellectual developments and the most perplexing predicaments of the life of the time.
He considered the global studies of whole civilizations in the manner
of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee to be dangerously speculative
and likely to produce distorted images of the particularity of the historical
experience of each civilization, a clear sense for which is what ultimately
mattered. A more fruitful approach, he thought, would be to focus on
particular analytical issues or processes of crucial significance to humanity,
as well as to the various social and humanistic disciplines, and to study
them in depth both within their own civilizational setting and in
comparative civilizational perspective. It is in this manner that a reliable
understanding of whole civilizations and of their historical trajectories, as
well as the essential qualities of "being civilized," would eventually
emerge, although we are not yet at the point for fruitful syntheses of this
scope. This approach to comparative civilizational studies came to be
known as the civilization-analytic perspective.
At the inception of his presidency of the ISCSC, Nelson co-authored
with Vytautas Kavolis a programmatic statement, presented at a meeting
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington on December 29, 1972. In this "inventory and statement" on
"comparative and civilizational perspectives in the social sciences and
humanities," the main approaches toward comparative studies were
reviewed and criticized. Nelson preferred two of the eight "horizons"
presented and explored. One was "the comparative study of institutions
and 'symbolic designs' against the backgrounds of determinate civilizational
settings." The other was "the comparative study of the histories,
sociologies, psychologies of civilizational complexes and processes as
these are perceived and work in the settings of intercivilizational
relations and encounters."
In the part of the statement he wrote, Nelson urged: "It is only as we see
the civilizational complexes in the crucibles of intercultural process that
we can perceive the distinctive thrusts and patternings of different
civilizational and societal structures."
The two approaches he considered most promising:
... describe ways of studying all sociocultural processes and issues
within a distinctive civilization-analytic perspective which proves
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preferable on general intellectual grounds (comprehensiveness,
depth, compactness) to existing horizons and approaches in history,
anthropology, sociology. The comparative depth-historical study of
process and pattern in civilizational perspective offers great advantages
over current varieties of structuralism, structural functionalism,
schematic Marxism, phenomenology, inductivist empiricism, and
so on.
The statement concludes with a more detailed specification of the main
elements, as then perceived, of the civilization-analytic perspective. 2
Nelson would speak of the "comparative historical differential sociology
of sociocultural processes and civilizational complexes" and of "a
polyphonic depth history and sociology of cultural expression and
experience." Another name, "anthroposociology," he sometimes expanded in conversation into "psychohistorical anthroposociology," in
search of a way of stating plainly where the movement stood among the
academic disciplines.
Names were important to Nelson, and these shifts are clues to a
characteristic quality of his speech in general. He kept talking about old
concerns in renewed interpretative languages, seeking continuously to
extend the range and appeal of his cognitive thrust. Each linguistic shift
revealed or suggested new elements, angles of vision, possibilities. But
the shifts were not systematically explained, the implications of changes in
the rhetoric rarely spelled out in explicit detail. Nelson's sensitivity to the
flows of subjective experience and its cultural expression made him
averse to systematizing. He would systematize only when he went to
battle. And he would go to battle usually when he saw the theory of
culture inadequately developed by others.
Inadequacies in the theories of culture sooner or later proved to derive
from insufficient discrimination between particular symbolic designs, as
they have been shaped by particular peoples in the particular historical
settings of their life. This insufficient discrimination, lack of nuance in
approaching historical realities resulted in what he felt were the truly
Satanic sins of contemporary social science-schematism and uniformitarianism, that is, the invention of abstract conceptual typologies without
much perceptual content, and the search for generalizations about
human behavior that would hold for all men and women at all times,
independent of the particular histories of their institutions and their souls.
The social sciences which adopted these orientations Ben Nelson
considered superficial, capable of grasping only the specious. The
"depth-historical" understanding which he sought meant, first, a search
for the shared symbolic structures underlying both human conduct and
the most sophisticated symbolic formulations of a civilization and,
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second, a watchfulness for fundamental shifts of these structures in the
crucibles of cultural struggles and encounters between civilizations.
There were the eternal polyphonies of axial assumptions and rationales;
cultural logics, ontologies, and epistemologies; dramatic designs; structures of
consciousness and sensibility; systems of spiritual guidance; symbolic technologies; forensic frameworks; evidential canons; compelling metaphorsindeed, compelling metaphors all. To understand these symbolic configurations in their actual workings was to become aware of their
diversity, flux, and interpenetration in concrete historical settings. He
discussed organizing a journal of comparative civilizational studies, to be
named In Process. It appeared, after his death, as Comparative Civilizations
Review (1978-).
He described his "sense of the sociologica1," in a particularly revealing
manner, as deriving from "a predicamental vision," "the sense that
people everywhere, whatever the form and structure of their arrangements,
inexorably find themselves in the midst of predicaments which call forth
urgent responses in the way of passions, actions, efforts to achieve
mastery and control through multiple forms of affiliation, organization,
imposition and imputation." (It is perhaps not accidental that Ben Nelson
lists "passions," presumably in the dual sense of intensity of emotion
and suffering in which the term is used in the Christian and Romantic
traditions, first among the responses to "predicaments.") He added, in
Sociological Analysis, a key phrase from his final conception of sociology: "I
see no way of doing sociology without clearly relating to the structures of
existence of peoples, the structures of their experience, and the structures of
their expressions."3 For him, they were all symbolic structures, languages
for organizing both thought and action.
Nelson saw diverse kinds of symbolic structures everywhere, but,
unlike the structures which the structuralists see, these structures were
fluid, if viewed over time, and rigorously prescriptive, utterly clear in
their definition at any given time. All the fluidities had a way of ending up
as structures, and indeed one had to be firmly locked into some symbolic
design to experience "meaning." But there was more personal meaning
in the structures believed to be fictional than in the structures known to
be necessary: "mummery ... alone confers significance on acts which
might otherwise seem pointless and futile."4 It is not the profound that
needs a mask but that which, without a mask, could be neither profound
nor indeed human.
There is, in Ben Nelson's anthroposociology, a peculiar mix of a
medieval and early-modern need for decisive symbolic guidance, and a
sense of human existence as the continuous staging and dismantling of
various kinds of spectacles, none of which seemed to be meaningless. Life
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is theater and, in our times, he thought, a grotesque one, in which the
games of life, to which the magnificent rituals of earlier times have been
reduced, turn out to be indistinguishable from the dances of death-but it
is nevertheless to be analyzed rationally and lived in accordance with
clearly defined canons of responsibility, a position I have tended to
perceive as that of a late Roman intellectual.
As a scholar, Ben Nelson was an apprentice to the master puppeteer,
the spontaneous spectacle of culture, seeking an exact understanding of
how each string in all the diverse performances operates. The strings were
the particular lines of movement of faiths, of sciences, of technologies, of
laws, and the more immediate expressions of experience in literatures,
and only if they have left an intellectually impressive record and have had
practical effects on the historical scale were they worthy of being closely
watched. Only the "world-historical" nations seemed to matter in the
movements of civilizations.
He was unusually sensitive to the sources of modernity in the
spiritual movements of the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries. But he
also responded quickly to the most recent innovations of thought in a
variety of fields. He wrote more powerfully on Jean Genet than on Max
Weber and considered Paul Valery rather than Arnold Toynbee a master'
civilization analyst. He would have made a fine literary critic. One of his
most exhilarating articles is an inventory of analytical methods for the
history of psychiatry.
"Ben knew more about civilization than anyone I ever encountered,"
wrote his long-time colleague at the New School, and intellectual
antagonist, anthropologist Stanley Diamond. 5 He has left exemplary
civilization-analytic studies of key ideas and idea complexes in Western
civilization: the self and conscience, probability and certitude, the
categories of eros, logos, nomos, and polis, the emergence of universal
standards in economic transactions and international relations, and the
little appendix on friendship. In the comparative study of civilizations, he
had time to outline a distinctive approach. He wrote the dramatic
statement on "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters,"
developed his typology of sacro-magical, faith-, and rationalized structures
of consciousness, dissected the differential trajectories of the histories of
science in China and the West. In his work on the structures of
consciousness, Nelson has been particularly concerned with the social
contexts of illsif<ht-the historical conditions which have favored (or
blocked) the breakthroughs to the faith- and rationalized structures; less
with the social contexts of plausibility-the historical conditions which
sustain the vitality of a particular structure of consciousness once it has
been elaborated. His studies centered not on descriptive comparisons
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but on theoretical issues central to explaining the differential trajectories
of modernity in various parts of the world.
In these studies, he grappled with some of the key issues in the
problematics of civilization analysis, such as: Why did something of
universal significance emerge or become potent only in a particular
civilization? How come that the same problems have been subjected by
different parts of humanity to differing procedures and given diverse
solutions? Why are some major intellectual or institutional patterns
borrowed across civilizational lines and others are not? Why does
something which works well at one time cease to work at another? How is
comparative quietude broken by effervescences, efflorescences, and
aggressions?
Nelson did much to advance civilization analysis as a general
methodology for studying any theoretically significant social or humanistic
issue with full attention, first, to the cross-civilizational range of alternative
ways for dealing with it; second, to the interdependence of particular
solutions within the largest sociocultural configuration of which they
constitute understandable components; and third, to the changes over
time in the design and workings of particular civilizational structures in
the concrete sociohistorical settings in which they were located.
The relationship of his theoretically sophisticated work to sociological
theory as currently constituted has remained problematic. He was
engaged in reconciling Max Weber's processual with Emile Durkheim's
structural conception of society and concerned to incorporate into this
larger synthesis all that was vital in later historical, philosophic, and
psychoanalytic thought. But his main contribution to a comparativecivilizational SOCiology has been that of generating a pre-theoretical
matrix, a pluralistic repertoire of symbolic frames for capturing the
essential constituents of the great wealth of evidence on the diverse
modes of consciousness and currents of senSibility that a close historical
investigation reveals in any civilization. Benjamin Nelson has done more
than formulate a general theory of civilizations to which his name could
be attached; he has provided us with an evocative rhetoric which, instead
of limiting our attention to the questions he has raised, activates our own
scholarship by making alive the immense variety of symbolic designs that
must be identified and closely examined in doing serious work in
SOCiology, anthropology, intellectual history, studies of religion and of
philosophy and, he hoped, psychiatry.
Ben Nelson has created a language that makes it possible to talk about
all of the symbolic structures which tradition provides (or we create) for
interpreting experiences and guiding actions, but with particular attention
to those which focus on moral and intellectual responsibility. From
beginning to end he has been concerned with symbolic configurations

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol10/iss10/4

6

Kavolis: Nelson's Legacy of Comparative Studies
NELSON'S LEGACY OF COMPARA 71VE STUDIES

23

transcending those of a single society or language (though the structures
he found usually emerged in Greco-Latinized forms). He has greatly
increased our capacity to describe in precise and evocative ways
piHticular cultures and their changes arising from encounters and
conflicts between clusters of ideas.
He had his limitations. Not in his general statements of intentions, but
in his actual cross-civilizational studies, he tended to remain Westerncentered. Ben Nelson did not glorify the West, particularly the contemporary West, but, in all its mortifications (and, for him, we became
more real precisely in our mortifications), he still considered it, with Max
Weber, as having produced the only history of universal significance. He
tended to see other civilizations as answering Western questions and as
problematic in terms of what they, by Western standards, lacked: notions
of universal brotherhood in India, modern science in China, individual
conscience in the world of Islam. On these issues, he could be hard on the
experts.
As a man of the book and the theatre, Nelson could not quite take
mythology, that ancient, organic unity of reason and emotion, seriously
as a legitimate part of modernity. His love belonged to rationality, his
tenderness to language: he was quite extraordinary in the precision of his
evocations, terribly suspicious if not fearful of the messiness of inexact
emotions, experiences without structure, wildly utopian dreams. He was
curious about the metaphoric passions unleashed by the various social
and cultural upheavals of his later years, the possibility, around 1970, of
encountering on New York's Fifth Avenue, as he left his New School
office, walking impersonations of the different historical epochs and
cultural movements he had studied. But he was repelled by the lack of a
"reality principle" in most of this "revolutionary" and "counter-cultural"
creativity. There was much of a romantic consciousness in his conception
of sociology, held ardently in check by sobriety and the spirit of
scholarship.
The spirit in which he sought renewal of" our civilization-Occidental
and Oriental, Western and Eastern, alike" was that of literate, tragedysensitive rationalism and an adult, that is, illusionless, disenchanted
responsibility shared by all mature minds, regardless of their ideological
commitments, transcending in importance the lines of division between
religion and secularity, radicalism and conservatism. For an adult to be
"childlike" was the worst possible transgression against the requirement
for integrity. Nowhere in Ben's work does one find the slightest trace of
sympathy for the lost paradise of childhood.
And now we must ask: How central is the final achievement of
Benjamin Nelson to his chosen fields, history and sociology, and to the
other disciplines to which he offered it as a guide? Will these disciplines
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respond by embracing the "wider frameworks" of symbolic understanding that would save us equally from schematisms, whether scientific or
ideological, provincialisms uneducable or principial, the enthusiasms and
the burlesques? Or will a "new science of civilization analysis," a
homeless discipline, have to be founded or perhaps recovered once
again? Would Benjamin Nelson have had to confess, a few years hence,
that he failed in teaching sociologists, as he did declare in the autobiographical statement cited earlier that he had failed in enlightening
psychoanalysts?
The reviewers have judged Benjamin Nelson's work to be of major
significance in reconstituting the dynamic cultural frameworks which a
genuinely global sociology requires, in conceiving of comparative
SOCiology as a differential analytical history of consciousness. But while
Nelson's influence is spreading and his spirit-in its imaginative precision
and faithfulness to evidence-is alive to challenge others, he has not left a
viable school of sociology working on the agenda he has set. Perhaps his
repetitive agenda-formulating efforts were self-defeating. Nelson was
eager for followers, anxious about their faithfulness, and he did occasionally
use his own analytical categories in the manner of magical incantations.
But there has never been anything but sobriety in his vision.
The basic reason for the uncertain future of what Ben Nelson did after
The Idea of Usury is that his approach impressed too many people as a
peculiar kind of history of meanings: too structural for historians, too
intellectual for sociologists, unyielding in its intangibilities. Sociologists
still need to do detailed studies to understand how social conduct
generates itself out of the categories and symbolic matrices provided by
intellectual histories, and by the struggles of men and women to make
their histories meaningful. But that is now an inheritance of the friends
and critics of Benjamin Nelson.

NOTES

1. Benjamin Nelson, "Systems of Spiritual Direction," reprinted in this volume, p. 33.
2. Reprinted in part in Sociological Analysis 35 (1974) :129-141, as well as in Oil/lie Roads /0
Modernity (ed. by Toby E. Huff), pp. 230-243.
3. Symposium on his "Civilizational Complexes and lntercivilizational Encounters,"
Sociological Analysis 35 (1974) :131.
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